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MIGRATORY LAWYERS IN PRIVATE
PRACTICE: SHOULD CALIFORNIA APPROVE
THE USE OF ETHICAL WALLS?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the modem legal profession, where mobility is the norm, suc-
cessive conflicts' rules can quickly spread imputed conflicts when-
ever lawyers move among private firms? Imputed disqualification3
rules regularly present serious issues when attorneys move laterally
from one firm to another.4 Without a flexible approach to conflicts
of interest, the result is unnecessarily constricting for both clients and
attorneys.5 While no one seriously suggests that two partners within
a single firm could represent adversaries in litigation, 6 secondary
disqualification7 is not necessary, from both a practical and a policy
perspective, in every situation where one lawyer in the firm has a
successive conflict of interest concerning one of the firm's clients.8
1. Successive conflicts are conflicts of interest that arise for an individual
attorney as the result of that attorney's duty of loyalty and confidentiality to a
former client.
2. See RICHARD C. WYDICK & REx R. PERSCHBACHER, CALIFORNIA
LEGAL ETHICs 339 (2d ed. 1997).
3. Imputed disqualification, vicarious disqualification and secondary dis-
qualification are interchangeable terms for the disqualification of an entire law
firm that occurs when one lawyer's individual conflicts of interest arising from
previous employment are imputed to all other attorneys in the lawyer's work-
place.
4. See WYDICK & PERSCHBACHER, supra note 2, at 340.
5. See id.
6. Even commentators favoring the use of "ethical walls" find the mecha-
nism inadequate where the case involves current conflicting roles, rather than
successive conflicting representations. See Comment, The Chinese Wall De-
fense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 684-85 (1980).
7. See definition supra note 3.
8. See supra note 3.
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Where screening, or "ethical walls,' 9 is allowed to avoid vicari-
ous disqualification' °, courts cite practical concerns. In a leading
successive conflicts case, a large law firm representing Chrysler
Motors Corporation attempted to disqualify a plaintiff's small law
firm because one of the latter's partners had previously worked at the
large firm as an associate with access to confidential information
about Chrysler." In rejecting disqualification, the court emphasized
"[t]he importance of not unnecessarily constricting the careers of
lawyers who started their practice of law at large law firms simply on
the basis of their former association."'
' 2
9. This article uses the terms screening and "ethical walls" to describe the
metaphorical walling off of the tainted attorney that is required to avoid impu-
tations of conflicts. The term "Chinese Walls" is also often used to describe
the screening process but will not be used in this article. This term began to
appear in judicial opinions in the mid-1970s, but should be disfavored as cul-
turally insensitive today, regardless of the reason for the term's adoption.
Judge Low's concurrence in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court
is the only judicial criticism to date:
The enthusiasm for handy phrases of verbal shorthand is under-
standable. Occasionally, however, lawyers and judges use a term
which is singularly inappropriate. "Chinese Wall" is one such piece of
legal flotsam which should be emphatically abandoned. The term has
an ethnic focus which many would consider a subtle form of linguistic
discrimination. Certainly, the continued use of the term would be in-
sensitive to the ethnic identity of the many persons of Chinese de-
scent Modem courts should not perpetuate the biases which
creep into language from outmoded, and more primitive, ways of
thought ...
"Chinese Wall" is not even an architecturally accurate meta-
phor for the barrier to communication created to preserve confidenti-
ality. Such a barrier functions as a hermetic seal to prevent two-way
communication between two groups. The Great Wall of China, on the
other hand, was only a one-way barrier. It was built to keep outsiders
out-not to keep insiders in.
It is necessary to raise a clenched cry for jettisoning the out-
moded legal jargon of a bygone time. If the image of a wall must be
used, perhaps "ethics wall" is more suitable phraseology.
200 Cal. App. 3d 272, 293-94, 245 Cal. Rptr. 873, 887-88 (1988) (Low, P.J.,
concurring).
10. See definition supra note 3.
11. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d
751, 752 (2d Cir. 1975).
12. Id. at 753-54; see also Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar and Al-
USE OF ETICAL WALLS
California has no ethics rule specific to imputed disqualification,
nor do the California Rules of Professional Conduct address the use
of screening to avoid vicarious disqualification when successive con-
flicts occur in private law firm settings. The courts decide secondary
disqualification on a case-by-case basis, but generally rule that
knowledge obtained by one attorney in a firm will be imputed to all
other attorneys in the firm.13 Further, California courts extend the
presumption of shared confidences to summer associates.14 Califor-
nia courts have in fact expressed hostility to screening in private law
firm settings, with a very few key exceptions.15 Similarly, the
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules") do not formally accept the practice in private-law-
firm-to-private-law-firm inoves.16 Most jurisdictions impute the dis-
qualification to all the lawyers in the firm when these conflicts
arise. 17
But the American Law Institute, in section 204 of its Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers, approved the use of ethical walls where lawyers move from
one private law firm to another. 8 Section 204(2) applies only when
len, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that the greater mobility of
lawyers and an increase in firm mergers and size necessitate a more flexible
rule).
13. See Rosenfeld Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. App. 3d 566,
573, 286 Cal. Rptr. 609, 612 (5th Dist 1991).
14. See, e.g., Actel Corp. v. QuickLogic Corp., No. C 94-20050 JW, 1996
WL 297045 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 1996). Many jurisdictions apply the succes-
sive conflicts rules to secretaries and paralegals as well, though some courts
impose less stringent remedies. Query whether this makes sense, since the
policy suggests that non-lawyer personnel are more trusted to keep client se-
crets than are the lawyers themselves. See Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall,
887 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. 1994). Others equate support staff with lawyers
and disqualify the entire firm when support staff bring a successive conflict of
interest to the firm. See Smart Indus. Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 1176,
1185 (Ariz. 1994).
15. See Henriksen v. Great American Say. and Loan, 11 Cal. App. 4th 109,
117, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 188 (1992); Employers Ins. ofWausau v. Albert D.
Seeno Constr. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1998); see
also WYDICK & PERSCHBACHER, supra note 2, at 340.
17. See WYDICK & PERSCHBACHER, supra note 2, at 339.
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 204
at (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; WYDICK &
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"(a) any confidential client information communicated to the person-
ally prohibited lawyer is unlikely to be significant in the subsequent
matter"; (b) adequate screening measures are in place; and (c)
"timely and adequate notice of the screening has been provided to all
affected clients."'19 According to comment d(ii):
Screening must assure that confidential client information
will not pass from the personally-prohibited lawyer to any
other lawyer in the firm. The screened lawyer should be
prohibited from talking to other persons in the firm about
the matter as to which the lawyer is prohibited, and from
sharing documents about the matter and the like. Further,
the screened lawyer should receive no direct financial bene-
fit from the firm's representation, based upon the outcome
of the matter, such as a financial bonus or a larger share of
firm income directly attributable to the matter. However, it
is not impermissible that the lawyer receives compensation
and benefits under standing arrangements established prior
to the representation. An adequate showing of screening
ordinarily requires affidavits by the personally-prohibited
lawyer and by a lawyer responsible for the screening meas-
ures. A tribunal can require that other appropriate steps be
taken.
20
This Comment explores the issue of screening by examining the
law and the underlying policies and practical implications of using
ethical walls to avoid imputed disqualification. Part II discusses the
historical and policy reasons supporting the different approaches and
the resulting problems and benefits of screening. Part IH provides an
overview of the current law regarding successive conflicts and im-
puted disqualification in private law firm settings. Part IV focuses
on specific areas of California case law that indicate some judicial
willingness to approve the use of ethical walls. The Comment con-
cludes with a recommendation that California adopt a more flexible
approach to successive conflicts and allow screening as a solution to
the problem when lawyers move from one private law firm to an-
other.
PERSCHBACHER, supra note 2, at 340.
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 204(2).
20. Id. § 204 ent. d(ii).
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I. SCREENINGV. IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: THE POLICY
INTERESTS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE
Two principles lie at the heart of the ethics rules: undivided
loyalty to the client and the preservation of client confidences. Cali-
fornia Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) states that it is
the duty of an attorney "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her
client."21 Lawyers' obligations to maintain client confidences in
California are among the strictest in the nation. 2 A lawyer may not
even reveal confidential information about a client's intention to
commit murder.23 This strong policy favoring client confidentiality
seeks to promote uninhibited communication between attorneys and
their clients.24
The imputed disqualification rules are founded on the idea that
lawyers practicing in the same firm presumptively share confidences
with each other. This idea received its first official recognition by
the American Bar Association ("ABA") in 1931.25 But modem
times call for more flexible alternatives to an overly strict imputed
disqualification rule.
In 1975, the ABA first approved the use of ethical walls as an
alternative to vicarious disqualification of an entire firm26 In order
to attract the best and the brightest law school graduates to govern-
ment service, the ABA formally approved the use of screening in the
context of migrating government lawyers. 27 The ABA also consid-
ered the client's right to her counsel of choice, and the possibility of
21. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 1997).
22. See WYDICK & PERSCHBACHER, supra note 2, at 196.
23. See id.
24. See Neil W. Hamilton & Kevin R. Coan, Are We a Profession or
Merely a Business?: The Erosion of the Conflicts Rules through the Increased
Use of Ethical Walls, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 57, 71 (1998).
25. See id. at 73. "The ABA concluded that '[t]he relations of partners in a
law firm are so close that the firm, and all the members thereof, are barred
from accepting any employment, that any one member of the firm is prohibited
from taking."' Id. (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances, Formal Op. 33 (1931)).
26. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 342 (1975).
27. See id. at 119.
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abuse of disqualification motions in its decision.28  In 1983 the
Model Rules adopted this change with Rule 1.1 (a).
29
Also in 1983, the Seventh Circuit, in Schiessle v. Stevens, ex-
tended the exception- to the imputed disqualification rules for former
government attorneys to private migrating attorneys.3 ° Schiessle was
the first major case to allow the use of ethical walls as an alternative
to imputed disqualification where the affected attorney brought a
former client conflict from one private law firm to another. The
Seventh Circuit led the way in approving screening to avoid the
drastic measure of vicarious disqualification of firms, and the Sec-
ond, Sixth, and Federal Circuits followed with express approval of
the practice.3' The trend has continued with numerous jurisdictions
allowing the use of screening to solve successive conflicts when
lawyers change firms.
32
The policies behind the acceptance of ethical walls in private
law firm settings include the client's right to counsel of his choice,
concern about the financial burden of clients when they must secure
new counsel, and problems with the abuse of vicarious disqualifica-
tion motions. 33 Further, the "realities of modem day practice," as
firms increase in size and become more departmentalized, demand a
28. See id.
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(a) (1983).
30. See Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983).
31. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar and Allen, 849 F.2d 222
(6th Cir. 1988); Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying Seventh Circuit law); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Re-
search, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983); Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d
1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981);
see also infra Part I.1.B (noting that the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Federal
circuits, as well as federal district courts in Delaware, Kansas, and Missouri
have all permitted screening).
32. See, e.g., Cromley v. Board of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059 (7th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 816 (1994); Manning, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988); EZ
Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Schiessle, 717
F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983); Cheng, 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated onju-
risdictional grounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981); Petrovich v. Petrovich, 556 So. 2d
281 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720
(Minn. 1983); Kala Aluminum Smelting and Ref. Co., 688 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio
1998).
33. See Hamilton & Coan, supra note 24, at 86-87.
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more flexible approach to the issue of successive conflicts. 34 The le-
gal profession is in a state of perpetual motion, 35 and thus lawyer
mobility must also be considered, not as a policy issue, but simply as
an important reality of today's legal profession.
Some commentators give little credence to the policy considera-
tions driving the trend toward greater acceptance of ethical walls,
and are particularly offended by the notion that lawyer mobility
should be considered at all. But others recognize that
the rule of imputed disqualification [] could severely limit
the ability of lawyers to move from one law firm or type of
employment to another. A strict application of the rules
would impute all of a lawyer's disqualifications to the law-
yer's co-workers when changing jobs, even if no other law-
yer in the new office would, standing alone, be disquali-
fied.37
This, of course, would have a serious impact on the right of clients to
the counsel of their choice. "[T]he ability to deny one's opponent
the services of capable counsel, is a potent weapon. Confronted with
such a motion, courts must be sensitive to the competing public pol-
icy interest of preserving client confidences and of permitting a party
to retain counsel of his choice.,
38
A client whose attorney is disqualified incurs the loss of time
and money in being deprived of her counsel of choice.3 9 The inno-
cent client is compelled to retain new counsel, and may lose the
benefit of long-time counsel's specialized knowledge of the client's
matters.4 0 This is a major policy reason behind the Second Circuit's
34. See Analytica, 708 F.2d at 1269-70.
35. See Marcy G. Glenn, Conflict Issues When Attorneys Switch Jobs,
COLO. LAW., May 1998, at 49, 49.
36. See Hamilton & Coan, supra note 24, at 86-91.
37. Stephen J. Ott, Professional Responsibility, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 995,
1015-16 (1998).
38. Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 224 (6th
Cir. 1988).
39. See Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.
1978); see also Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1717,
1725, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 761 (1993).
40. See Government ofIndia, 569 F.2d at 739.
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early honing of the practical application of the "substantial relation-
ship" test: the court grants disqualification only upon a showing that
the relationship between issues in the prior and present case is "pat-
ently clear.
' 41
Misuse of the disqualification process is a significant problem,
as the motion to disqualify opposing counsel is frequently a tactical
maneuver.4' Even courts with a broad view of disqualification mo-
tions have expressed concern that the procedure may be abused if in-
voked solely to gain some tactical or strategic litigation advantage.43
III. THE LAW
Whether or not a successive conflict exists and whether or not it
is imputed to the entire firm involves a two-tiered analysis. The first
tier and threshold question is whether there is a successive conflict.
If there is no successive conflict for the individual attorney, the in-
quiry is over and no imputed disqualification is threatened. Where
there is a successive conflict, a court moves on to the second tier of
the analysis and addresses whether or not that conflict should be im-
puted to the entire firm. Both tiers of the imputed disqualification
analysis employ the substantial relationship test.
A. The Substantial Relationship Test
If a current representation is adverse to the interests of a former
client and, by reason of the former representation, the attorney re-
ceived confidential information material to the current representa-
tion, a lawyer may be individually disqualified from the current
matter.44 The California Rules of Professional Conduct and the
41. Id. at 739-40 (quoting Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Mo-
tors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754-56 (2d Cir. 1975)).
42. See River West, Inc. v. Nickel, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1297, 1306, 234 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 39 (1987) ("[I]t would be nalve not to recognize that the motion to
disqualify opposing counsel is frequently a tactical device to delay litigation.")
(quoting White v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 51, 55, 159 Cal. Rptr. 278,
280 (1979)).
43. See Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1725, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
761.
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1997);
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule
3-310 (1996).
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Model Rules allow the conflict to be cured with consent from the
former client.45 Where the lawyer has actual confidential informa-
tion, however, and consent is not forthcoming, the lawyer is disquali-
fied from the subsequent representation. The Model Rules also
provide that an attorney may not oppose a former client in a "sub-
stantially related" matter.47
The substantial relationship test was first enunciated in T.C.
Theatre v. Warner Bros. Pictures, and later was included in the
Model Rules under Rule 1.9(a).49 The California ethics rule on suc-
cessive conflicts does not include the substantial relationship test.50
The standard was adopted by the Ninth Circuit,5' then in the Califor-
nia state courts, 52 and is now the proper test for whether a lawyer
obtained confidential information by way of a former representation
that is material to a current representation.
53
45. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1997);
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule
3-310 (1996).
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1997);
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule
3-310 (1996).
47. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1997).
48. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
... [W]here any substantial relationship can be shown between the
subject matter of a former representation and that of a subsequent ad-
verse representation, the latter will be prohibited ....
... the former client need show no more than that the matters em-
braced within the pending suit wherein his former attorney appears on
behalf of his adversary are substantially related to the matters or cause
of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former
client The Court will assume that during the course of the former rep-
resentation confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the
subject matter of the representation. It will not inquire into their na-
ture or extent Only in this manner can the lawyer's duty of absolute
fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule relating to privileged
communications be maintained.
Id. at 268.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1997).
50. See RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA Rule 3-310 (1996).
51. See Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980).
52. See Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. App. 3d 483,
192 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1983).
53. See Rosenfeld Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. App. 3d 566,
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Courts take various approaches to the substantial relationship
test-some broad,5 4 some narrow,55 some emphasizing access, 56 and
others looking only to the facts.5 7  California courts take a broad
view of the substantially related test. To determine whether the for-
mer and the latter matters are substantially related, the California
Court of Appeal has held that courts should look to the similarities
between the two factual situations, the likeness of the legal issues in-
volved, and the extent of the attorney's participation in the two
cases.
58
B. The Presumptions
Once the court determines there is a successive conflict and the
personally-prohibited lawyer is disqualified from the current repre-
sentation, the issue of secondary disqualification of the entire firm is
575, 286 Cal. Rptr. 609, 614 (1991).
54. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266
(7th Cir. 1983). Judge Posner explains that matters are "substantially related" if
the lawyer could have obtained confidential information in the first
representation that would have been relevant in the second. It is ir-
relevant whether he actually obtained such information and used it
against his former client, or whether-if the lawyer is a firm rather
than an individual practitioner-different people in the firn handled
the two matters and scrupulously avoided discussing them.
Id.; see also Cornish v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 467, 475-77, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 383, 387-88 (1989) (explaining that if there was even one confidential
communication, a substantial relationship exists, and there is a basis for dis-
qualification).
55. See, e.g., Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d
Cir. 1978) (setting forth that "substantially related" means that the issues in the
prior and present cases are "identical" or "essentially the same").
56. See, e.g., Evans v. Artek Sys., 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
that disqualification is appropriate if a lawyer "had access to, or was likely to
have had access to, relevant privileged information in the course of his prior
representation").
57. See, e.g., Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 349 (Wyo. 1988) (adopt-
ing an approach to the substantial relationship test that asks "whether in the
factual context the matters involving the two clients are related in some sub-
stantial way," because if the "matters have common facts, the attorney is in a
position to receive confidential information which possibly could be used to
the detriment of the former client in the later proceeding").
58. See H. F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Salomon Bros., Inc., 229 Cal. App. 3d
1445, 1455, 280 Cal. Rptr. 614, 620 (1991); Rosenfeld Constr. Co. v. Superior
Court, 235 Cal. App. 3d 566, 576, 286 Cal. Rptr. 609, 614-15 (1991).
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considered. Two presumptions guide the court's analysis of whether
or not the new firm is vicariously disqualified. First, where there is a
substantial relationship between the present and former matters, it is
presumed that the migratory attorney learned the former client's con-
fidences during the representation. 59 The second presumption is that
the migrating attorney shared those confidences with the attorneys at
his new firm.
60
There is "near universal agreement" that the first presumption is
rebuttable.61 The potentially-prohibited lawyer must demonstrate to
the court that she did not obtain confidential information regarding
the former client while working at the previous law firm. 62 It is cus-
tomary for the migrating attorney to establish lack of knowledge of a
former client's confidential information without the client's confi-
dences being violated at the hearing.63 The lawyer's proof will gen-
erally be in the form of evidence showing non-access to the work of
other lawyers at the former firm 64 If the lawyer is not able to show a
lack of knowledge of client confidences regarding the previous mat-
ter, she has not rebutted the presumption.65 Similarly, if the court
finds the former and present matters to be substantially related, using
the same analysis as above, then the presumption stands.
If a lawyer does not rebut the first presumption, the court moves
on to the second presumption.66 Whether the presumption of shared
confidences should be rebuttable is an area of controversy in the pro-
fession and deep division in the courts.67 Where the migrating law-
yer brings confidential information concerning a current client at the
new firm, the law presumes that the laterally-moving lawyer will
share those confidences with the lawyers at the new firm. 68 This
presumption is irrebuttable in a great majority of states, including
59. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS Op LAW
AND ETHIcs 323 (5th ed., Aspen Law & Bus. 1998).
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 324.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 324-25.
66. See id. at 325.
67. See id. at 323.
68. See id. at 325.
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California. 69 In some states, however, it is rebuttable by demon-
strating that "'specific institutional mechanisms' [i.e. screening]...
[have] been implemented to effectively insulate against any flow of
confidential information from the 'infected' attorney to any other
member of [the] present firm. 70 The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and
Federal Circuits, and federal district courts in Delaware, Kansas, and
Missouri have all permitted screening to rebut the presumption of
shared confidences of former clients.71 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, the Ohio Supreme Court, and the Louisiana Court of Appeals
have also expressly approved ethical walls.72 Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington expressly allow
for screening through their ethics rules.
73
C. What Factors Make an Ethical Wall?
Building an ethical wall or screen around a newly hired, con-
flicted attorney requires that the partners at the firm give the proper
degree of forethought and planning to the situation. Courts expect
the new firm to have these screening mechanisms in place prior to
the lateral lawyer's arrival.74 Otherwise, the possibility for breaches
69. See id. at 323.
70. Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1065 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted).
71. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Skiar and Allen, 849 F.2d 222,
224 (6th Cir. 1988); EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (applying Eighth Circuit law); Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic
Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying Seventh Circuit
law); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983); Cheng v. GAF
Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on jurisdictional grounds,
450 U.S. 903 (1981); Geisler v. Wyeth Lab., 716 F. Supp. 520, 526 (D. Kan.
1989); School Dist. v. Acands, Inc., No. 87-0903-CV-W-6, 1989 WL 99138, at
*1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 1989); Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins.
Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 428 (D. Del. 1986).
72. See Petrovich v. Petrovich, 556 So. 2d 281, 282 (La. Ct. App. 1990);
Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 732 (Minn. 1983); Kala Alu-
minum Smelting & Ref Co., 688 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ohio 1998).
73. See ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1999);
MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1999);
MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1999); OREGON
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1999); PENNSYLVANIA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1999); WASHINGTON RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1999).
74. See Miller v. Chicago and N. W. Transp. Co., 938 F. Supp. 503 (N.D.
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of confidentiality clearly exists, and there is no assurance that the
former client's secrets are protected.
The typical elements of an ethical wall include "physical, geo-
graphic, and departmental separation of attorneys; prohibitions
against and sanctions for discussing confidential matters; established
rules and procedures preventing access to confidential information
and files; procedures preventing a disqualified attorney from sharing
in the profits from the representation; and continuing education in
professional responsibility.,7 5 The firm must establish rules and pro-
cedures to prevent inadvertent disclosure of confidential information
as well as sanctions that will be enforced if such disclosure occurs.
76
A court reviewing the adequacy of these safeguards will also expect
some formal assurance that any inadvertent disclosures will be
promptly reported.77
The actual process implemented should include a memorandum
distributed to all employees prior to the new attorney's arrival in-
structing them not to discuss any aspect of the conflicted matter in
the new attorney's presence, and indicating that the new attorney is
denied access to all files pertaining to that matter or client.78 The re-
spective files should be removed from common file cabinets and
placed in a separate, locked, restricted cabinet.7 9 The new lawyer
must be instructed not to discuss the conflicted matter or client with
anyone at the new firm, and not to access any of the corresponding
files.80 The new attorney should also be directed not to have any
contact with the client or other individuals, such as witnesses, in-
volved in the conflicted matter.8' And, finally, the new lawyer must
not share in the fee from the matter posing a conflict.
82
When determining whether a proper ethical wall has been estab-
lished, courts will also consider "the size and structural divisions of
Ill. 1996).
75. Henriksen v. Great Am Say. and Loan, 11 Cal. App. 4th 109, 116 n.6,
14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 188 n.6 (1992).
76. See Ruel v. Quinn, No. 910640, 900153, 910522, 1994 WL 879837, at
*3 (Mass. Super. Ct June 3, 1994).
77. See id.
78. See Miller, 938 F. Supp. at 504-05, 507.
79. See id. at 507.
80. See id. at 504, 507.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 507-08.
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the law firm involved., 83 Even in jurisdictions that allow screening
to rebut the presumption of shared confidences, the smaller the law
firm, the less appropriate and effective the screening mechanism is
for protecting client confidences. 84 Accordingly, screening will not
enable a solo practitioner to avoid imputation of an employee's con-
flicts. 85 By contrast, departmental configuration that helps facilitate
the maintenance of an ethical wall by reducing the contact between
the conflicted attorney and specific attorneys responsible for the pre-
sent representation, will give a court more confidence in allowing the
mechanism to rebut the presumption of shared confidences.
86
IV. CALIFORNIA'S REJECTION OF SCREENING FOR PRiVATE LAW FIRM
CONFLICTS MAY NOT BE ABSOLUTE
There are two significant cases that seem to provide windows in
California law for the potential acceptance of screening to cure lat-
eral move conflicts in private law firms. One California Court of
Appeal case, Klein v. Superior Court, implies that California courts
might approve an ethical wall if the new lawyer did not actually
work on the former client's matter while at the previous firm.87 In
addition, the Ninth Circuit case that gave California the substantial
relationship test expressed approval of the "peripheral representa-
tion" standard developed by the Second Circuit; this standard would
allow the use of ethical walls in certain private law firm scenarios. 88
No California cases have arisen that provide clear guidelines for
limited uses for screening of lawyers who bring successive conflicts
from one private law firm to another. This is probably due to the fact
that the firms with the best resources to bring such cases and make
such arguments are the same firms that carefully review every new
attorney's background for any glimmer of potential conflict before
finalizing that attorney's employment with the new firm. If any such
conflict is revealed, and client consent is not forthcoming, the offer
83. Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar and Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 226
(6th Cir. 1988).
84. See Solow v. W. R. Grace & Co., 83 N.Y.2d 303, 311(1994).
85. See id. Though not specifically stated, this is the natural inference.
86. See Manning, 849 F.2d at 226.
87. See Klein v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 894, 909, 244 Cal. Rptr.
226, 234 (1988).
88. See Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980).
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of employment is rescinded since the expense of a potential imputed
disqualification motion and the risk of losing clients is considered
too great. No one wants to take such a chance. Despite the under-
standable caution with which large firms approach potential con-
flicts, openings in the current case law do exist and could result in
judicial acceptance of an expanded use of ethical walls. The excep-
tions suggested by these cases would allow lawyers to avoid, imputed
disqualification in certain circumstances when successive conflicts
are brought from one private law firm to another.
A. Klein v. Superior Court: Rebutting the Second Presumption with
a Balancing of Factors
Klein v. Superior Court89 is the only California case suggesting
that the presumption of shared confidences may be rebuttable in
some situations.90 In several parts of the opinion, the Klein court im-
plies that California courts might approve an ethical wall where the
affected attorney did not work on the former client's matter while at
the prior firm.9' The court favorably cites Chambers v. Superior
Court92 for the general proposition that "disqualifying the individual
lawyer and screening him from the firm can suffice, in a proper
89. 198 Cal. App. 3d 894, 244 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1998).
90. See id. at 910,244 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
91. See id. at 913,244 Cal. Rptr. at 237 (distinguishing Panduit Corp. v. All
States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984), disapproved on an-
otherpoint in Richarson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985), from the
case at hand). The court pointed out that in Panduit "the attorney [who was]
held to be disqualified had not himself personally had access to confidential
information about the former client .... The evidence... did not demonstrate
that the client's confidences had been passed on or were likely to have been
passed on to members of the second firm." Klein, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 244
Cal. Rptr. at 236. The Panduit court therefore applied Seventh Circuit law and
allowed screening to rebut the presumption of shared confidences. See Pan-
duit Corp., 744 F.2d at 1580, 1582. The Klein court also points out that the af-
fected attorney in the Klein case participated directly in the former client's
case, and thus both his disqualification and that imputed to his new firm must
result. See Klein, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 913-14, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The Klein
court also distinguishes Chambers v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 893,
175 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1981), indicating that the government attorney involved in
Chambers had not been substantially involved with matters related to the in-
stant litigation, and had been screened off from the litigation from the begin-
ning. See Klein, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 912, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
92. 121 Cal. App. 3d 893, 175 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1981).
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case."93 Chambers found such an exception for a government law-
yer, but the Klein court suggests that further exceptions exist. "The
test is whether the individual attorney had any responsibility over
matters related to the instant action or had acquired confidential in-
formation regarding the action and whether the firm had taken suffi-
cient protective measures to screen the attorney from participa-
tion."5
94
Two major points may be distilled from the Klein decision.
First, the court emphasized that the attorney whose disqualification
was upheld had been directly involved in the prior matter, and thus
the trial court properly inferred that confidential information had ac-
tually been passed to other members of the present law firm.95 Sec-
ond, the court stated that it was partly because no ethical wall was
erected that imputed disqualification had to result.96 The court "re-
luctantly" ruled that vicarious disqualification was necessary "where
a partner in a law firm has been disqualified from representation be-
cause of his prior receipt of confidential information, and where
there has been no attempt to screen him from the litigation at
hand."
97
While properly assessing that very few California cases have
allowed a law firm to continue representing a client when a member
has been disqualified, the Klein court also restated a standard from
William H. Raley Co. v. Superior CourP8 that characterized auto-
matic disqualification as harsh and unfair. Raley endorsed the notion
that vicarious disqualification should not occur automatically, but
should only result from weighing and balancing relevant factors.99
The factors, as restated in Klein, are: "[(1)] the likelihood of actual
conflict or imparting of confidences, [(2)] the hardship [to the client]
in loss of the law firm's representation, [(3)] the stage of the legal
93. Klein, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 909, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. See id. at 913,244 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
96. See id. at 913-14, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
97. Id. at 913, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 238 (emphasis added).
98. 149 Cal. App. 3d 1042, 197 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1983).
99. See Klein, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 244 Cal. Rptr. at236.
USE OF ETI-HCAL WALLS
proceedings at which the motion for recusal was made, and [(4)]
other related factors."'100 Thus, Klein indicates that where a law firm
has erected proper ethical walls, and the disqualified attorney's work
on the former client's matter was of a more attenuated nature,
screening can be an acceptable device for avoiding imputed disquali-
fication of the entire firm.
Some commentators claim that Henriksen v. Great American
Savings & Loan'0 ' forecloses any possible acceptance of screening
suggested by Klein.10 2 To the contrary, the Henriksen case simply
distinguished Klein as "factually inapposite."'0 3 Henriksen pointed
out that, to the extent the Klein court created a rule of law, the rule
did not apply to the facts of Henriksen.0 4 In Henriksen the affected
attorney had blatantly switched sides and then cited Klein as support
for avoiding imputed disqualification of the entire firm.' ° 5 In fact,
while Klein posits circumstances where screening will suffice in pri-
vate law firm settings, the Klein court is clear that the mechanism is
"not applicable when the attorney in question performed work for the
opposing party in the same lawsuit.''06 The Klein exception to the
strict prophylactic rule of imputed disqualification is not disturbed by
Henriksen. The two cases are consistent.
B. Trone v. Smith: Rebutting the Second Presumption with the
Peripheral Representation Standard
The Ninth Circuit has left open another possible area of excep-
tion to the imputed disqualification rule. In Trone v. Smith 0 7 the
court stated, "[i]f there is a reasonable probability that confidences
were disclosed which could be used against the client in later, ad-
verse representation, a substantial relation between the two cases is
presumed." 0 8 A footnote to this statement, however, indicates that
100. Id.
101. 11 Cal. App. 4th 109, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (1992).
102. See THoMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 1998 SELECTED
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 147 (1998).
103. Henriksen, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 116, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2dat 188.
104. See id. at 112, 116, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2dat 185, 188.
105. See id.
106. Klein, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 912, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 237 (emphasis added).
107. 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980).
108. Id. at 998.
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the harshness of this rule is mitigated by the peripheral representation
standard developed by the Second Circuit.'0 9 Under this standard, an
attorney previously associated with a firm that handled matters sub-
stantially related to those in which his disqualification is sought may
avoid disqualification if he did not have any personal involvement in
the substantially related matters, and did not actually receive any
confidential information relevant to the disqualification motion." 0
The court simply cited Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co."' and Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.112 for this notion
of peripheral representation and failed to provide an example of the
type of factual situation to which this standard applies; the court did
not clarify what impact this exception has when vicarious disqualifi-
cation is threatened.
13
In Gas-A-Tron, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
abused its discretion when it ordered disqualification of an entire law
firm representing plaintiffs in an antitrust action brought against sev-
eral major oil companies, including Shell Oil Company ("Shell") and
Exxon Corporation ("Exxon"). 114 The district court disqualified the
firm because it hired a young associate who had previously worked
for another law firm that represented Shell and Exxon in other mat-
ters." 5 While at the previous law firm, the associate had performed
an assortment of tasks commonly handled by young associates at
large firms, and worked on litigation directly and indirectly affecting
cases that the firm undertook for Shell and Exxon." 6 The inference
that the associate therefore possessed confidential information arose
from his potential physical access to Shell and Exxon files, and his
association with attorneys at the previous firm who actually had such
confidential information."1
7
109. See id. at 998 n.3.
110. See id.
111. 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1976).
112. 518 F.2d751 (2dCir. 1975).
113. See Trone, 621 F.2d at 998.
114. See Gas-A-Tron, 534 F.2d at 1324.
115. See id. at 1324-25.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1325.
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One interpretation of the Trone footnote is that the peripheral
representation standard may simply be another means of rebutting
the first presumption involved in an imputed disqualification analy-
sis--that the affected attorney is presumed to have confidential
information about the former client." 8 Unlike the opening up of the
irrebuttable second presumption presented by Klein v. Superior
Court,"9 the acceptance of a peripheral representation standard in
Trone may be read as another avenue for establishing that no confi-
dential information was brought to the new firm by the allegedly
tainted attorney because the attorney actually had no such confiden-
tial information.
This reading is problematic, however, since the entire firm
should have been disqualified on the facts of Gas-A-Tron if the pre-
sumption of shared confidences is irrebuttable. In Gas-A-Tron, the
associate did not present facts suggesting non-access to the pertinent
oil company files, nor did he present evidence that he did not have
access to the work product of attorneys at the previous firm who,
undisputedly, had personal knowledge of confidences received from
Shell and Exxon. 20 Thus the associate did not rebut the first pre-
sumption as required under the broad view of disqualification in
California.
On closer examination, the peripheral representation standard is
more likely intended as a method of rebutting the second presump-
tion-that the migrating lawyer will share with fellow attorneys at
her new firm all confidences brought from the previous firm. In Gas-
A-Tron, the firm was allowed to show that the associate's involve-
ment with the previous firm's work for Shell and Exxon was of such
an attenuated nature that no imputation of possible confidences was
warranted.12 1 The court reasoned that the associate did not actually
118. See supra Part III.B (explaining the two presumptions involved in the
vicarious disqualification analysis).
119. 198 Cal. App. 3d 894, 244 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1988).
120. See Gas-A-Tron, 534 F.2d at 1324; see supra Part rI-B (explaining the
two presumptions involved in the vicarious disqualification analysis).
121. See Gas-A-Tron, 534 F.2d at 1325.
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obtain confidences about Shell or Exxon that would be relevant to
the pending litigation against them, nor had he worked on matters
substantially related.' 22 But the court also indicated that the facts of
the case were virtually identical to those considered in Silver Chrys-
ler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,23 which approved
rebutting the presumption of shared confidences. 24 Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. articulated a standard that differentiated between at-
torneys who become heavily involved in the facts of a particular
matter and those who are merely peripherally involved.1
25
By citing Gas-A-Tron and Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. for the
peripheral representation standard, the Trone court suggested a nar-
rower view of disqualification motions, such that, under limited cir-
cumstances, the second presumption would be rebuttable. Undoubt-
edly, one instance where this standard is applicable involves summer
associates who are considered tainted by attenuated and peripheral
work assigned to them when working in a big firm for just one sum-
mer.' 26 The exception may extend further to other attorneys based
on the extent of their involvement with a former client's matter. To
what degree, however, is not evident from the case law. Nonethe-
less, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit is signaling the need for a nar-
rower view of imputed disqualification with respect to certain types
of potential conflicts.
V. CONCLUSION
In jurisdictions like California, which takes a broad view of im-
puted disqualification, there is a greater danger that the ethics rules
will be invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons, designed
to harass opposing counsel.' 27 When this happens, the purpose of the
rules is subverted.' 28 If California takes a more flexible approach
122. See id.
123. 518 F.2d751 (2d Cir. 1975).
124. See Gas-A-Tron, 534 F.2d at 1325.
125. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 518 F.2d at 756.
126. See, e.g., Actel Corp. v. QuickLogic Corp., No. C 94-20050 JW, 1996
WL 297045 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 1996).
127. See Kevlikv. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 848 (1st Cir. 1984).
128. See id.
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that does not require imputed disqualification on such a broad basis,
there will be less danger that the motion will be abused.
The realities of modem day legal practice must also be consid-
ered. Lawyers are moving more freely from one firm to another, and
law firm mergers have become commonplace. 129 At the same time,
the availability of competent legal specialists is now concentrated
under fewer roofs. 30 The potential for unnecessary secondary dis-
qualifications is great unless there are reasonable alternatives to firm
disqualification whenever there is a successive conflict.
Other jurisdictions see the value of allowing screening for some
types of successive conflicts in private law firm scenarios, and the
result has not been widespread compromise of client confidences.'
31
The overriding public policy of client confidentiality at the core of
all ethics rules is entirely consistent with the additional policies
served where screening is permitted. The cases that have allowed the
use of ethical walls to rebut the presumption of shared confidences
have accorded the maintenance of confidentiality paramount ef-
fect.1
32
Even given the heightened value placed on client confidentiality
in California, a more flexible approach to secondary disqualification
would not reflect a lesser commitment to this policy. To the con-
trary, vicarious disqualification rules do not really serve clients when
the rules are applied in a strict prophylactic fashion, because inflexi-
ble, across-the-board rules do not allow for a balancing of all factors
in a given situation.
When the circumstances cannot support a successful ethical
wall, then imputed disqualification is necessary and should be re-
quired. But when the situation supports screening, and the most
stringent measures are taken, an ethical wall can and does protect
129. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar, and Allen, 849 F.2d 222,
225 (6th Cir. 1988).
130. See id.
131. See supra Part f[I.A-B (discussing the vicarious disqualification rules in
jurisdictions that allow screening).
132. See, e.g., Miller v. Chicago and N. W. Transp. Co., 938 F. Supp. 503
(N.D. IUI. 1996) (upholding the district court's approval of an ethical wall only
upon a detailed showing that a total screen protecting client confidences had
been established prior to the conflicted attorney's arrival at the new firm).
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former client confidences without doing so at the expense of current
clients.
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